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Abstract            In 2009, Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) was approached by several smaller 
colleges and universities in the United States for commercialization assistance.  Since that 
time, Georgia Tech, a national leader in intellectual property creation and 
commercialization, has been attempting to replicate its successful faculty spin-off program, 
VentureLab, at these smaller cohorts.  This effort is rooted in the belief that spin-off worthy 
innovation exists at smaller colleges and universities without a process to reach fruition, 
limiting the potential economic impact of federally sponsored innovation.  Academic 
publications around university commercialization and faculty spin-offs suggest various 
variables which influence the outcome of university technology transfer efforts.   This paper 
discusses these variables and others in the context of our efforts with interviews at eleven 
institutions.  The findings suggest additional factors for consideration in the replication of 
large university commercialization programs at resource constrained, smaller colleges and 
universities. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Since 2009, Georgia Tech has been approached by several smaller colleges and universities in the United 
States to exchange best practices for intellectual property licensing.  With funding and guidance from the 
Economic Development Administration, we were able to meet with numerous colleges and universities to 
discuss their unique situations.  From that work, Georgia Tech has been able to develop a process for 
working with many of these smaller cohorts
1
.  This paper contains a brief history of university intellectual 
property management, an overview of common pathways for innovation at universities, a discussion of types 
of university startups, and a best practices review for smaller colleges and universities.   
1.1 Brief History of U.S. University Intellectual Property Management 
Today’s concept of technology transfer originated in a 1945 report from Vannevar Bush, Director of the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development, to President Franklin Roosevelt.  In “Science, The Endless 
Frontier”, Bush encouraged a centralized approach to government sponsored research toward scientific 
progress and stressed the importance of basic research in improving health, security, and public welfare of 
the United States.  The report recommended the creation of a Science Advisory Board and eventually led to 
the inception of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950 to increase the flow of new scientific 
knowledge through sponsoring basic research and developing scientific talent.  To support both applied 
industry and basic research, Bush also recommended that the government strengthen the patent system and 
clarify uncertainties in the tax code (Bush, 1945). 
 
Although this report played a pivotal role in shaping science policy and promoting basic research, taxpayer 
dollars were spent on a myriad of technologies and inventions, but only a handful actually made it to market.  
While the National Institute of Health (NIH), Public Health Service (PHS), and Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) were important sponsors of research, little was done to address the ownership of 
technologies and the intellectual property that was created.   
 
                                                          
1 Smaller is relative to the sponsored research budget.  The exact definition of smaller will be provided in section 3.1. 
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To transfer ownership from government to an academic institution, NSF and HEW developed Institutional 
Patent Agreements (IPA) detailing the conditions for university ownership (Mowery and Sampat, 2001a).  
These agreements allowed universities to own inventions they created under government-sponsored research 
projects and then grant exclusive licenses with private enterprises to develop university technology.  
However, the IPAs were cumbersome because each university had to negotiate separately with various 
government agencies (Mowery, 2001).   
 
To address weaknesses in IPAs, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act that enabled the commercialization of 
these inventions between all universities and all government agencies.  Another significant legislation 
promoting technology transfer is the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, which mandates 
Federal laboratories to actively seek opportunities to transfer technology to private industry, universities, and 
state and local governments, giving preference to U.S. based businesses where partners agree to manufacture 
in the U.S. (Industrial Partnerships Office, 2005). 
 
While some universities had experimented with licensing Bayh-Dole innovations prior to 1980 (Roberts, 
1991), the practice was bolstered by the 1980 act.  According to Mowery and Sampat (2001b), the passage of 
Bayh-Dole spurred a dramatic expansion in technology transfer offices from 25 to over 200 from 1980 to 
1995.  The AUTM (Association of University Technology Managers) 2008 Licensing Survey reported that a 
staggering 3,381 startup companies, founded on university licenses, were in operation at the end of 2008 
(Kordal, Sanga, and Tieckelmann, 2009). 
 
The Bayh-Dole act of 1980 that launched university commercialization has been touted as “the most inspired 
piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century” (The Economist, 2002). Universities 
across America became centers of innovation and their researchers were able to commercialize inventions by 
creating new companies or licensing technology.  Proponents of Bayh-Dole argued that millions of taxpayer 
dollars were spent developing technology that would not benefit the public good.  They claimed companies 
were not willing to invest their own money to develop a nascent technology without rights to make a profit 
on their investment.  An abundant number of technologies have been developed and brought to market as a 





While some have hailed the Bayh-Dole Act for revolutionizing university commercialization and technology 
transfer, others have criticized the legislation for distorting universities’ missions and research priorities to 
overspending of taxpayer dollars. A major issue was giving companies exclusive rights to publicly funded 
research that would later sell that technology to the consumer.  Another criticism of the Bayh-Dole Act is that 
corporate sponsored research is changing the tenets of universities and higher education such as disinterested 
inquiry and information exchange through confidentiality agreements and publishing delays. (Press and 
Washburn, 2000; Thursby and Thursby, 2003; The Economist, 2005).  Press and Washburn (2000) have 
argued that “universities themselves are behaving more and more like for-profit companies”.  Most all 
university commercialization and technology transfer literature posits that 30-years post Bayh-Dole, there 
have been shifts in university-industry relations, although the literature varies on raising practical or abstract 
questions about the changing dynamics. 
 
1.2 Various Intellectual Property Models for U.S. Universities 
Figure 1 illustrates common pathways for the management of intellectual property generated at U.S. 
universities.  This effort was undertaken to depict a conceptual university ownership model (outlined 
rectangles) through output nodes which result in university startups (shaded rectangles), juxtaposed against 
alternate university ownership models and an inventor ownership model (outlined shapes with missing 
corners) discussed in recent literature (Kenney and Patton, 2009).  At its core, this illustration serves to 
define the term spin-offs for this study and portray the myriad of paths that inventions can travel in between 
creative spark and perceived outcome.  
                                                          
2 Press and Washburn (2000) reported that university commercialization adds 2,200 new firms, over 260,000 new jobs, tax revenue, and 
contributes $40 billion annually to the economy. 
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The starting point for this flowchart is the investment in sponsored research by industry clients and the 
federal government.  A large majority of the industry funded research at universities is for the most part 
directed by industry and frequently in collaboration with industry.  Therefore, intellectual property rights 
developed with industry are often encumbered and not available for licensing to third parties.  However, as a 
result of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the United States, the intellectual property from federal government 
sponsored research is the sole property of the university or universities which conducted the research.  
Therefore, the nodes depicted relate primarily to the processing of federally sponsored research.   
1.2.1 University Ownership Model 
First, the most common and pervasive university ownership model (outlined rectangles) will be reviewed.  
Through a process of in-reach to the faculty, deans, and chairs within the university, the Technology Transfer 
Office (TTO) solicits disclosures for inventive effort.  In some cases, the TTO engages directly in ideation 
around the potential applications for research results.   
In addition to the traditional TTO structure, there are two other methods by which inventions are disclosed 
and resolved. Also, several examples of public/ private partnership alternatives are provided for post-
disclosure technology transfer agents, post-patent licensing agents, and post-license gap or seed funding 
agents.   
 Public/Private Partnership Case (Post-Disclosure): In 2003, Noetic Technologies, a for-profit 
company, signed a service contract with the University of Southern Mississippi (USM) to serve as its 
TTO.  Noetic Technologies screens disclosures, helps researchers determine the most appropriate path, 
and then provides step-by-step assistance throughout the commercialization process.  Under this 
contract, Noetic also serves clients outside the university sector, including research organizations and 
private companies, and acts as the point of entry for companies interested in sponsoring research at the 
University.  Noetic has a fixed-fee service agreement with the University of Southern Mississippi and 
can earn additional revenue from entities outside the university sector through licensing royalties, 
equity shares, or management fees which vary based upon the engagement and task. 
   
Noetic Technologies provides a variety of services to help commercialize a product early in the 
process, starting with screening university disclosures.  Once a technology has been assessed, Noetic 
works with the inventor to determine the appropriate commercialization path (for example, license, 
patent, or publish) and assists them with the process.  Noetic licenses technologies to third parties or, if 
appropriate, aggregates related licenses as a package.  It also operates an incubator in a technology 
park near the USM campus. 
  
In collaboration with the Mississippi Technology Alliance, Noetic Technologies helps inventors apply 
for state sponsored seed funding.  Alternately, as a for-profit organization, Noetic can choose to invest 
its own funds in a startup venture.  Noetic provides coaching and management to the researcher, such 
as market research or intellectual property assessments, or it may develop a management team around 
the invention.  With access to industry, angel investors, and service providers, Noetic serves an 
important network function for researchers.  In addition, Noetic bolsters industry-university relations 




 According to the literature, there exists a faculty “gray market” for the transfer of intellectual property 
to industry, circumventing the established technology transfer mechanisms.  The faculty can publish 
their research (Kenney and Patton, 2009), leave the university to form a company without disclosing 
(Nicolaou and Birley, 2003), form a startup company while maintaining their faculty position 
(Audretsch, Aldridge, and Ottel, 2006), and/or consult directly with a firm transferring intellectual 
property for fees or equity (Thursby, Fuller, and Thursby, 2009). 
Returning to the path of ideation/invention disclosures to TTO in Figure 1, the disclosures are initially 
reviewed for encumbrances such as classified research categorization and multiple inventors across 
                                                          
3 See http://www.noetictechnologies.org/ 
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institutions.  Those deemed to be unencumbered will be screened for patent applicability, open source 
applications, or dissolution based upon technical and market assessments.   
For those disclosures which are patented, the university will typically pursue licensing to an established firm, 
a new firm, or a spin-off formed within the university.  Those that are not licensed remain on the shelf, 
perhaps to be reviewed again for license as technology and markets evolve.  According to the 2008 AUTM 
licensing survey, 16.8 percent of licenses are assigned to new firms/startups (Kordal et al., 2009).   
Public/Private Partnership Case (Post-Patent): Aetos Technologies is an example of a private company that 
seeks out inventions and launches startup companies as a private partner to a university.  In 2003, Auburn 
University’s TTO invited Aetos to its campus to facilitate university commercialization pursuits.   Although 
Aetos is an equity partner with Auburn, the company also co-develops projects with individuals, private 
companies, research organizations, and other universities.  Aetos receives management fees, operating 
income, or equity shares of any assets for its services, depending on the type of invention.  Aetos is located in 
the Auburn Technology Park, in close proximity to the university’s TTO and faculty researchers. 
   
Aetos enters the commercialization pathway after a technology has been disclosed and patented by Auburn.   
At this stage, Aetos provides technology evaluations, product/process development support, and management 
and financing resources.  For promising inventions, Aetos guides the technology through the one of several 
commercialization paths: (1) obtaining license rights from Auburn and then sub-licensing the invention to a 
third-party, (2) taking an invention directly to market though a spin-out, or (3) securing co-development 
partnerships to generate cash flow and establish a planned exit strategy.  Currently, Aetos does not bundle 
licenses for third parties, however the potential is ripe based on the types of technology developed at Auburn 
(for example, Molecular Recognition).
4
   
 
University commercialization literature provides three designations for licensing innovations to startups: 
technology (a firm is created independent of the university with no formal affiliation with faculty inventor), 
hybrid (faculty stays with university and participates in ownership of the startup), and orthodox (faculty 
leaves university to create startup) (Smilor, Gibson, and Dietrich, 1990; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003).  For 
purposes of this paper, portions of the methodology will focus on the subset of hybrid spin-offs. 
 
Public/Private Partnership Case (Post-License): The Business Acceleration and Technology Out-licensing 
Network (BATON) is one of many programs housed within the North Carolina Biotechnology Center, a 
private, non-profit organization funded through taxpayer dollars.  The Biotechnology Center’s mission is to 
provide long–term economic and societal benefits to the state through supporting biotechnology research and 
business, education, and policy development. 
 
BATON serves North Carolina University TTOs, research organizations, and individual inventors throughout 
the state in development of startups.  University TTOs manage the disclosure, screening, and vetting process 
internally.  Afterwards, if a university intends to form a biotech startup, the university can request assistance 
from BATON to secure service providers, network opportunities, and financing. 
 
As part of providing access to financing, BATON offers gap or seed funding from the Biotechnology Center.  
Also, BATON offers coaching to assist inventors in developing business plans, setting financial goals, 
creating strategic development plans, establishing milestones, and researching market regulatory paths. 
BATON also helps a startup build a management team and provides access to network professionals, venture 
capitalists, angel investors, and potential customers.  It has created a list of service providers that provide 
discounted services (pro bono, discounted, at cost, deferred, equity exchange) for a wide variety of startup 
needs.  With the overarching goal of economic development, BATON attempts to foster startups that will 





                                                          
4 See http://www.aetostech.com/ 
5 See http://www.ncbiotech.org/baton 
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1.2.2 Inventor Ownership Model 
Kenney and Patton (2009) describe the strengths and weaknesses of both the inventor ownership model and 
the current university ownership model.  As proposed, with changes in federal policy and TTO procedures, 
the faculty would be able to choose the commercialization path and agent for bringing their innovations to 
market.  In this environment, the university is merely a possible agent for the faculty.  The authors postulate 
that TTO offices with effective practices will remain a viable commercialization choice for faculty.   
1.2.3 Alternate University Ownership Model 
Conversely, Kenney and Patton (2009) detail two strategies by which universities could retain their 
ownership of intellectual property while increasing the impact on these inventions on the economy.  First, the 
authors suggest the classification of all Bayh-Dole intellectual property as public domain.  This would foster 
the greatest dispersion of intellectual property across the economy.  Second, the universities could adopt a 
100 percent non-exclusive license strategy.  In this manner, the universities would foster greater impact by 
enabling all competitive companies, not just a single entity.  In addition, the universities would receive some 
compensation for TTO operations.  
1.2.4 Public versus Private Institution 
Jensen (2009) reported that public universities were more prolific at generating startups.  This observation is 
perhaps in response to the economic development mission of public universities, creating local jobs.  
Research by Pressman (2001) and Tornatzky et al. (1995) (as cited in Shane, 2004) support the conclusions 
that spin-offs remain in the state where the university research emanated, creating jobs. Conversely, licenses 
to existing firms typically reside outside the university’s state boundary, resulting in less of an economic 
impact for local industry and employment.   
1.3 University Ownership Model: Faculty Startups and Hybrid Spin-offs 
Most interestingly, 59 universities or 31 percent of AUTM Licensing Survey respondents had one or no 
startups in 2008 (Kordal et al., 2009).  This statistic begs the question, “What are the enabling and 
constraining factors for these research universities?”   
Based upon a review of current literature for university startups or faculty spin-offs, a model of independent 
factors which might influence startup activity at these research institutions has been created.
6
  The literature 
can be agglomerated into seven categories around startup/ spin-off efforts.  Figure 2 depicts a faculty spin-off 
(picture in center) founded based upon innovation from the university, operating in a university culture under 
guidance of a TTO, receiving coaching from inside and outside the university, obtaining capital from sources 
inside and outside of the university, accessing talent for the startup, and linking with extended networks for 
access to markets.  The vertical blocks denote the source of factors as either intra-university or extra-







                                                          
6 Unfortunately, the definition of a university startup is not consistent between reviewed literature sources.  Therefore, the observations 
drawn from these publications must be observed under this lens. 
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Figure 2: Model of Independent Factors Influencing Faculty Spin-offs 
 
The following sections provide a concise review of the seven factors. 
1.3.1 Innovation  
Two attributes of innovation make the disclosures more appealing for university startup companies over 
licenses to existing firms.  First, Thursby and Thursby (2000) reported that earlier stage technologies are best 
for licenses to university startups.  In most cases, these technologies are not mature enough and require seed 
investments to migrate the technology along the readiness scale.
7
  Second, innovations which appear to be 
divergent or dramatic improvements over existing innovations are more uniquely suited for university 
startups (Wood, 2009) as they create a large potential markets.  
According to AUTM’s Licensing Activity Survey for 2008, the following statistics were collected from 191 
respondents.  These statistics appear to cascade consecutively as a subset of the previous measure; however, 
there is a varied time lag effect between several of the statistics.  The longest lags are between 1) patents filed 
and patents issued and 2) patents issued and license/options both of which could span across surveys.  
AUTM provides a 3 year cumulative measure of disclosures and research dollars but only single years 
numbers for patents filed, patents issued, and licenses.  
The survey reports 595 university startup companies were defined as newly formed firms which licensed the 
patent.  There is no distinction for hybrid, technology, or orthodox licenses as described by Nicolaou and 
Birley (2003). 
While AUTM collects survey data, there is no reporting of ratios or relationships.  There are several 
calculations that could contribute to the understanding of faculty startups. 
                                                          
7 NASA and the Department of Defense use Technology Readiness Level continuums to measure the degree to which a technology is 
ready for infusion or market application. 
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 Sponsored dollars per startup (efficiency) – limited analysis because of the lag between funding and 
startup, and the funding is not delineated by source (federal and non-federal) or type of science. 
 Startups per license (efficiency) – valuable data but not tied to faculty involvement with the licensor 
or economic development mission of the university. 
 Segmentation by funding amount and efficiency – could suggest opportunities for programs to 
improve conversion of invention into innovation. 
 1.3.2 University Culture 
Many universities question the benefits of faculty commercialization and are not willing to provide financial 
and staff resources to support university startup activities (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003).  Therefore, any 
university pursuit of faculty spin-offs would need top down support for this culture (Bauer, 2001; Clark, 
1998).   
If the culture and resources are in place, a few respected, pioneering faculty can set the example for others in 
their departments and across campus (Feldman et al., 2000).  Shane (2004) describes a contagion effect 
which can spread across the institution as more faculty spin-offs are formed (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006; 
Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, and Stoto, 1989; Kenney and Goe, 2004).   
Evidence of university support for faculty commercialization can be manifested by lenient use of university 
resources (Tornatzky et al., 1995; as cited in Shane, 2004) and flexible guidelines around faculty 
participation in spin-offs (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2001).  Addressing the individual researcher, Roberts’ 
(1991) found that faculty with more extroverted personalities were the best candidates for pioneering a new 
spin-off initiative.     
In general, the benefits of faculty spin-offs are improvements in the quality of faculty research (Louis, Jones, 
Anderson, Blumenthal, and Campbell, 2001), increased retention and attraction rates for faculty (Powell and 
Owen-Smith, 1998), and better rounded education for students (Georgia Tech TI:GER Program).  Zucker, 
Darby, and Brewer (1998) concludes that more prestigious universities create more startups, which suggests 
that increasing startups within a university will improve its reputation. 
Finally, it has been shown that there is a positive link between the quality of the engineering faculty, based 
upon National Research Council ratings, and TTO startup licenses (Jensen, 2009).  This finding supports the 
notion of creating a university culture which attracts quality researchers with an interest in 
commercialization. 
1.3.3 Technology Transfer Office (TTO) 
Beyond top down university support for faculty spin-offs, the TTO can implement policies which can 
motivate faculty to create startups within the auspices of the university.  The following are some of the 
policies found in published literature. 
 Exclusive licenses: 90 percent of licenses offered to university startups were exclusive licenses 
versus only 37 percent of licenses to existing firms were exclusive (Pressman, 2001).  An exclusive 
license provides the startup with an opportunity to mature the technology in a non-competitive 
environment. 
 Equity Ownership: Feldman (2001) reported that university equity ownership had been increasing 
over the previous 20 years.  Also, from 1993 to 1998 one study documented that 74 percent of 
universities elected equity share in startups (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003).  Providing equity 
ownership in lieu of license fees eases the cash flow burden for a startup. 
 Faculty Royalty Share:  DiGregorio and Shane (2003) observed that increasing the faculty royalty 
share by 10 percent reduced the faculty spin-off rate by 20 percent.  Therefore, to incent faculty 
spin-off activity, the TTO should reduce the royalty share, thus encouraging faculty startups as a 
means to obtain a greater financial result (ownership of firm over royalty from license).   
 Express License: Georgia Tech has developed a certificate program for its faculty GT:IPS (Georgia 
Tech Integrated Program for Startups).  For faculty who complete the commercialization course, the 
university will provide streamlined licenses, a first among U.S. universities. 
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In addition to policies, the staff and resources of the TTO can impact the success of faculty spin-off 
programs.  Wright, Vohora, and Brinks (2003) wrote that many universities lack staff and resources to 
support faculty spin-offs, lessening their number.  The AUTM 2008 survey found that 57 of 191 TTOs have 
five or less full-time equivalents including licensing officers, management, and all other staff (Kordal et al., 
2009).  Jensen (2009) compared TTO staff size and age of the TTO office to startups activity and found them 
to be positively related. 
Also, Lockett, Wright, and Franklin (2003) found that the presence of TTO staff with startup credentials 
improved the office’s startup activities.  To face this staffing issue, some universities are choosing to contract 
out portions of their intellectual property management activities in order to adequately serve the institution.  
As mentioned earlier, Noetic is one such example.  Other universities use scouts, aggregators, and other 
agents to license, bundle, or form startups.   
1.3.4 Capital 
The ability for faculty spin-offs to access capital is vital to their development. By definition, these startups 
are more divergent and early stage, requiring capital to mature market ready innovations.  Florida and 
Kenney (1988) found that venture capital access is important for startup support.  A study in the United 
Kingdom by Wright et al. (2003) observed that there was more startup activity in universities with pre-seed 
funding.  Conversely, DiGregorio and Shane (2003) reported that availability of capital investment by 
universities or venture capital firms is slightly, negatively correlated to startup rates at universities.  
In the AUTM 2008 Licensing Activity Study, only 12.5 percent of all the university startups formed between 
2006 and 2008 received no outside funding (Kordal et al., 2009).  The most prevalent sources were friends 
and family, venture capital, state funds, angels, and university funds.  At Georgia Tech, our VentureLab 
program has utilized a combination of state funds, SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research), angels and 
venture capital, leveraging just over $14 million in state funding with over $500 million in outside 
investment in faculty spin-offs.  
1.3.5 Coaching 
In complement to traditional TTO programs, several universities are standing up what Gulbranson and 
Audretsch (2008) describe as proof-of-concept centers.  The MIT Desphande Center and USD Von Liebig 
Centers are the two examples highlighted in the paper; however, Georgia Tech has its own entity in 
VentureLab.  These centers seek to support faculty spin-offs by addressing the seven independent factors 
from Figure 2: innovation, culture & TTO, coaching, capital, talent, and networks.  Also, these university 
affiliated organizations reside in close proximity to the universities, making it easier for the faculty to 
actively participate (Shane and Stuart, 2002).  
Beyond TTOs and proof-of-concept centers, many universities have affiliated incubators.  These incubators 
provide additional coaching outside the early formative stages of the spin-off.  Incubation services generally 
provide support as described by the five C’s developed at Georgia Tech: center, community, connections, 
consulting, and credibility.  The Georgia Tech incubator ATDC (Advanced Technology Development 
Center) is one of the world’s oldest and most successful incubators.  It has graduated more than 120 
companies which have raised over $1 billion in outside funding.  Despite this success, DiGregorio and Shane 
(2003) found that incubation by universities is not correlated to startup rate. 
1.3.6 Talent 
As the life-cycle evolution of the spin-off moves further away from university influence, the publications 
around talent and networks becomes sparse.  For Georgia Tech’s VentureLab program, a significant amount 
of time is spent coaching faculty about the importance of securing key management talent for the spin-off.  
At VentureLab, serial entrepreneurs are often asked to provide guidance for these faculty spin-offs which can 
often lead to the serial being hired as the CEO.  In addition, many incubation programs also focus on access 
to talent as one of their key offerings (Smilor and Gill, 1986).  
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1.3.7 Networks 
The importance of extended support networks of service providers, customers, manufacturing partners, 
channel partners and others becomes paramount for these new firms’ longevity and success.  Nicolaou and 
Birley (2003) state that these “exo-institutional networks” for university startups help assure that faculty will 
stay at the university while maintaining ownership of a portion of the startup.   
2.0 Methodology 
The methodology for this paper is multimodal.  First, we examined the AUTM 2008 Licensing Activity 
Survey to understand the connections between research, disclosures, licenses, and startups. In addition, we 
are testing a hypothesis that there is an underserved group of smaller colleges and universities that can 
support faculty spin-offs.  For this group, we will try to identify best-in-class universities to survey in future 
work. 
Second, the NSF’s (National Science Foundation) WebCASPAR database contains self-reported survey 
information on research funding by type of source and type of science.  We will review this data for a 
proposed segment of smaller colleges and universities.   
Third, we will assess our past work and relationships with eleven smaller colleges to present data on overall 
trends for cohort strengths and weaknesses.  Web sites for the eleven will also be reviewed.  
Fourth, our effort will include a summary of the literature nomenclature for startups and spin-offs around 
university licensing. 
3.0 Research Results 
3.1 University Research and Licenses to Startups 
Based upon data contained in the AUTM 2008 Licensing Survey, there is a positive relationship between 
research expenditures and number of university licenses let to university startups (Kordal et al., 2009).
 8,9,10
  
There is clearly a lag in the conversion of research dollars into disclosures, and licenses into startups 
(sometimes years); however, the long term research budgets for these universities are fairly stable, making 
this analysis plausible.  
Given this relationship, as research dollars decline in the AUTM respondent population so do the number of 
licenses to startups.  In fact, of the 41 universities reporting no licenses to startups in 2008, 34 (or 83 percent) 
had research funding below $200 million.  Because a large proportion of the universities without startups are 
found in this less than $200 million segment, those universities will be the target for our study.   As a point of 
perspective, for 2008, these 34 universities collectively represented over $2.3 billion in research which was 
not connected to a startup.    
3.2 Targeting Smaller Colleges and Universities (<$200 million in research) 
3.2.1 AUTM 2008 Licensing Survey Data 
Utilizing AUTM 2008 data for universities with at least one startup, measures of university startup 
performance were calculated for four subsets of the survey respondents.  Based upon the obvious differences 
in startup activity $200+ million and under $200 million in research, these two groups were selected for 
analysis.  In the course of the effort, smaller subgroups from the under $200 million and $200+ million 
                                                          
8
 All AUTM data utilized for this paper excludes U.S. Hospitals and Research Institutions, Canadian Institutions, and Third-Party 
Technology Investment Firms.  
9 The AUTM research expenditure amounts are inclusive of federal, industrial and other funding.  The survey does not collect hard 
science research funding which typically leads to spin-offs. 
10 In 2008, AUTM defined a startup as a new entity formed to receive a license from the university.  The definition could be more 
specific to include breakouts for hybrid, orthodox, and technology startups. Additional information on lineage of the technology licensed 
for each type of startup would assist future analysis. 
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segments were created based upon their performance generating 3 or more startups.
11
  From the 
segmentation, a group of 19 universities has emerged with BiC (best-in-class) metrics for startup activity at 
institutions with under $200 million in research.  Table 1 enumerates their outstanding measures of 4.3 
startups on average, a very low $23.3 million of research per startup, and a high level of licensing to startups 
(1 in every 2.9 licenses).  This far exceeds the efficiency of even the larger $200M+ universities with 3+ 
startups. 
Also of note, while the <$200 million grouping has fewer startups per university, they appear to be more 
efficient in the ones they create, needing $30 million less in research per startup and performing marginally 
better on licenses per startup ratio.  This efficiency dichotomy deserves additional study. 
Table 1: Startup Metrics by University Research Funding Amount 
 
Based upon the Table 1 metrics, the “BiC” universities have a clear advantage in startup leverage and 
efficiency.  Further research with these universities needs to be conducted to understand if this finding is 
indicative of the application of the intra- and extra-university factors identified in Figure 1.  From the AUTM 
2008 survey, directionally, the BiC group (1) is less likely to have an associated hospital (53 percent versus 
37 percent all others), (2) has one fewer TTO licensing FTEs at 3.0, (3) is equally as likely to license to a 
startup outside the state (23 percent of all BiC licenses to startups versus 27 percent all other), (4) and has 
only one private university in the group,
12
 indicating a potential leaning of the BiC toward economic 
development.  
3.2.2 NSF, Web CASPAR 2008  
In addition to our review of the AUTM data, we assessed the 2008 NSF WebCASPAR (Integrated Science 
and Engineering Resources Data System) database which contains research funding for 676 colleges and 
universities.  WebCASPAR indentified the 594 U.S. research institutions with <$200 million in research 
funding.  This group represents 88 percent of all U.S. research universities.   
Of particular note, using the AUTM university respondent with the lowest research funding amount as a floor 
($3.2 million), WebCASPAR contains another 209 universities with research between $3.2 million and $200 
million that did not participate in the AUTM study.  This opens the question as to, “How much research 
funding has no startup outcome?”  Arguably, the amount is much larger than the $2.3 billion estimate from 
the previous section of this paper.   
                                                          
11 The variable “3 or more startups” was chosen because “4 or more startups” yielded a very small, single digit sample of universities. 
The “2 or more startups” variable was not used because the 3 or more startups” performance was more outstanding. The “1 or more 
startups” variable was not chosen because of the incidence of licenses to startups outside the state, year to year repeatability, and lower 
performance on the metrics. 




Avg. # of 
Startups per 
University




$200+ 6.4 $87.4 8.2 63
<$200 2.6 $41.4 4.6 49
$200+ (3+ Startups) 9.4 $72.1 6.5 43
<$200 (3+ Startups) 4.3 $23.3 2.9 19
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Unfortunately, discrepancies between self-reported research funding amounts recorded by AUTM and 
WebCASPAR limit comparisons between datasets.  For 2008, it was observed that more than half of the 82 
(<$200M) AUTM institutions reported research dollars which varied +/- 10 percent when compared to the 
amounts self-reported in the WebCASPAR survey.  This variability is possibly explained by differences in 
survey respondents and university fiscal years.     
Nevertheless, WebCASPER provides a unique level of detail around the sources and types of research 
funding.  Matching the 82 AUTM companies (<$200M in research) with their WebCASPAR responses 
revealed several interesting findings.  Specifically, research expenditures were enumerated for federal and 
non-federal sources.  And, within federal sources, the data is categorized by type of science funded.  From 
this data, we have developed a federally funded “hard science”(FHS) measure which combines engineering, 
physical science, geosciences, life science, and math/computer research funding into one number, excluding 
psychology and social sciences.   
Based upon the hard science agglomeration, the AUTM 82, on average, received 52.9 percent of their total 
research funding or $4.34 billion from FHS research.  The BiC 19 garnered a smaller 41.5 percent of total 
funding from FHS research or roughly $14 million per university. Based upon internal faculty spin-off 
performance and two years of technical assistance, Georgia Tech has been working on the assumption that 
smaller colleges and universities must have at least $30 million in FHS research to support faculty spin-off 
activity.  The AUTM BiC funding of $23.3 million in total research per startup and the WebCASPAR BiC 
$14 million in total FHS research is well below our expectation.     
3.3 Observations from Smaller College and University Cohorts 
Over the past two years, Georgia Tech has interviewed or provided technical assistance to eleven smaller 
colleges and universities with research funding between $5 million and $160 million.  These universities 
range between no spin-off activity and a couple spin-offs over the past few years.   
Our startup company coaches, “Venture Catalysts”, have worked with over 150 faculty based spin-off 
companies, and other faculty in developing a snapshot of this cohort group.  As a team, the Venture Catalysts  
rated the eleven universities based upon each of the intra- and extra-university factors using a scale of gap 
(no-experience), nascent (newly developed experience), transitional (improving experience), or robust (very 
experienced).  Overall, the teams’ ratings ranged between gap and transitional measures.  No robust ratings 
were provided.   
For four of the cohorts, there are simply no innovation building blocks.  They have the task of trying to 
increase disclosures, if possible, and determine if faculty startups will be part of the long-term university 
culture.  Perhaps, as has been discussed in Georgia for many years, several of these smaller colleges and 
universities could band together to share resources, with or without advisement from a larger mentor 
university.  For the remaining seven universities, several weaknesses and strengths were evidenced. 
The weakest ratings were around access to external capital (SBIR, venture, angel, etc.) and internal capital 
(internal seed funds).  From our experience, connections to external capital resources are a major barrier for 
faculty spin-offs.  In smaller communities, the ability to attract venture capital is complicated by the minimal 
amount of potential deal flow.  Also, if the state does not have an SBIR assistance center, obtaining grants to 
fund research and commercialization are challenging.  Georgia Tech, through its ATDC (Advanced 
Technology Development Center) incubator makes connections for faculty spin-offs to meet with and present 
to venture capitalists.  In addition, ATDC operates a SBIR assistance program to support companies with 
grant preparation.  
For internal capital, there are two options.  One, the university can tap state funds designed to provide 
gap/seed stage investments in faculty innovations, moving the technology closer to commercialization.  If the 
state does not offer one, a case should be made to the leadership to create one.  In Georgia, we have the 
successful Georgia Research Alliance VentuerLab fund which has placed millions of dollars into Georgia 
Tech faculty spin-offs.  Our university has been able to leverage this investment 35 to 1 with outside funding.  
The attraction of matching investment alone validates this initiative.  Two, the faculty member can make a 
case to tap existing university IRAD (internal research and development) funds to enhance the innovation.  
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The strongest ratings were for external coaching (incubation, acceleration) and access to networks.  
Typically, the university is affiliated with an incubator or accelerator in the local community.  In some cases, 
the university actually operates the incubator.  In either case, if incubation exists, the TTO should be actively 
encouraging faculty to connect with incubator staff and to transition potential startups into incubation.   The 
Georgia Tech ATDC has over 400 technology company members, many of which are faculty spin-offs 
originating from our VentureLab program. 
For access to networks, universities typically have extended networks of alumni, community leaders, 
extension programs, economic developers, and corporate research clients.  These connections can be 
leveraged to support the faculty spin-offs as they formalize.  From our experience, the largest gap in 
networks is access to potential customers.  These connections are essential for placing prototypes in potential 
customer hands to garner feedback. 
The remaining ratings for talent and internal coaching were neither strong nor weak, but do represent 
challenges for even larger universities.  For access to entrepreneur talent, Georgia Tech developed a 
cascading entrepreneur survey which helps to identify entrepreneurs in a community, creating an inventory 
which can be useful for networking and filling CEO positions for startups.  Beyond CEOs, our university 
struggles with filling management positions for our startup community.  For internal coaching, some smaller 
cohorts have access to faculty, staff, or entrepreneurs to provide coaching.  At Georgia Tech, our VentureLab 
program provides the Venture Catalysts with startup experience to coach hybrid spin-offs. 
Table 2 provides an overall view of the key hurdles and potential workarounds by factor for this smaller 
college and university cohort when compared to traditional licensing practices. 
Table 2: Factor Hurdles and Workarounds for Smaller College and University Cohorts 
 
3.4 Phased Approach 
Finally, based upon our work with this cohort, Georgia Tech has developed a phased approach to tackle the 
founding and growth of a faculty spin-off program.  For simplicity and effectiveness, Georgia Tech coaches 
these cohorts through three stages.  In Figure 3, the initial Phase (A) is to work with the university to 
establish internal processes to solicit disclosures and gain faculty interest in hybrid spin-offs.  Within Phase 
A, the university must increase invention disclosure rate (more disclosures lead to more startups,
13
 create a 
                                                          
13 AUTM 2008 data reveals a strong link between university disclosure and startup numbers. 
Factors Hurdles Workaround
Innovation Not enough disclosures to feed 
process
Target select highly funded, 
entrepreneurial faculty to drive 
disclosures
Culture & TTO Focused on licensing not start-ups , 
(very different process); headcount 
Solicit President’s support; adopt pro-
spin-off policies; cross university 
collaboration  
Internal Coaching Limited skills and experience Connect with entrepreneurs in
community to donate time
Internal Capital Non-existent Tap university IRAD budgets; pursue 
state funding
External Coaching Limited connection Link with incubation system in area
Talent Limited connection Conduct cascading entrepreneur 
inventory, hold open houses
External Capital Never required for licensing SBIR program, Angel networks, Serials
Network Limited connection Engage business community, chamber, 
economic developers
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Figure 3: Three Phases for Implementation of Faculty 
Hybrid Spin-off Effort 
positive culture to promote faculty participation, and structure the TTO office and policies to become pro 
spin-off.  
Subsequently, the university must focus 
on Phase B to establish an internal 
coaching network, perhaps with serial 
entrepreneur volunteers, and some access 
to gap or seed funding.  The massive 
effort to create spin-offs in Phase A will 
go to waste without the coaching and 
seed programs to assist the faculty 
member. 
In Phase C the formalization of 
relationships with extra-university 
connections will be essential for 
shepherding the new entity into the 
marketplace.  These networks can be safe 
harbors for the small companies as they 
leave the insulated surrounding of the 
university.    
Finally, while the phased approach 
appears to be sequential, there is no one 
path to enable a university for faculty spin-off success.  However, the phases present a real world model in 
which necessary conditions must exist for spin-off activity.  For example, without significant disclosure rates 
and research, there will be no building blocks on which to form a company.  
 
4.0 Conclusions 
The pathways by which university inventor ideas become commercialized are varied.  This paper reviews the 
specific pathway for hybrid faculty spin-offs.  With a foundation in the literature, a model of factors 
impacting the success of hybrid spin-offs was developed.  The model was utilized as a guide for documenting 
Georgia Tech’s interaction with a cohort of 11 smaller college and universities. 
This paper also outlines how smaller colleges and universities (<$200 million per year in research) are 
addressing intellectual property creation and commercialization.  The two primary challenges impede success 
are access to both internal capital and external capital.  Some of the more proactive smaller colleges and 
universities are addressing these primary and other secondary challenges through a series of creative and 
innovative workarounds.  In fact, this group of smaller colleges and universities considered “best-in-class” 
appears to be even more efficient in some measures than their much larger rivals.  Surprisingly, there is an 
opportunity to take advantage of an untapped pool of research at smaller colleges and universities that have 
yet to create or report startup companies – estimated to be far in excess of $2.3 billion per year. 
Much of this paper was based on the qualitative interaction with only 11 colleges and universities.  In 
addition, the literature review has inconsistencies in the definitions for startups and spin-offs.  As noted, the 
data from AUTM and WebCASPAR could have been more homogenous.  A more quantitative and thorough 
follow-on study is recommended to overcome these shortcomings. 
This paper has also identified three new opportunities for future studies.  First, conducting case studies for 
the 19 BiC universities to determine how they have achieved efficiencies in startup formation.  In addition, 
measures of their effectiveness at raising funds (internal and external) and growing jobs should be collected.  
Second, investigate if and how the 19 BiC contribute to Venture Hubs (regional ecosystems of 
commercialization).  The goal would be to use existing data sources to formulate and test a hypothetical 
measure of the strength of universities linked to local commercialization ecosystems.  Potential datasets 
could include: 1) funding for commercialization, clusters, and proof-of-concept centers; 2) Entrepreneurship 
Index and other measures of a favorable environment; 3) external capital for communities; and 4) web review 
C • Extra-university 
connections
B • Internal coaching and 
seed capital
A • Disclosures, culture, 
and TTO structure
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of talent and social networks.  Thirdly, track the lineage of inventions which were the foundation for 
sustainable, hybrid faculty startups. 
Special thanks to Ben Hill, James Seals, Roberto Casas, and Ann O’Neill for generously sharing with the 
authors their expertise and insights in executing and replicating Georgia Tech’s successful VentureLab 
faculty spin-off model. 
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